This article investigates the role of thwarted voters and newcomers in setting the result of the December 6 th , 2009 presidential runoff in Romania. For this purpose it employs panel survey data from the Romanian Election Studies, collected across three waves: pre-election, between the two rounds, post-election. Initially, it draws a picture of the main evolutions in turnout and vote between the first and the second round, with a special emphasis on vote transfers and risks associated to turnout and pro-winner overreporting. Then it analyzes the thwarted voters and their rationalities of making secondorder electoral choices in the presidential runoff. The influence of campaign developments and long-term party/candidate preferences is assessed. Finally, the article investigates the profile of newcomers (people only voting in the runoff) and the mechanisms of political mobilisation in their case. A special attention is given to how newcomers make the electoral choice in the presidential runoff and to the influence of the campaign developments on that choice.
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In order to set Traian Băsescu's unexpected victory in a proper framework of understanding, at least two observations are needed. First, his overall victory across polling stations abroad was large enough to compensate for the fragile advantage of Mircea Geoană across domestic polling stations.
Second, the overall distance between the two candidates in terms of domestic vote was of only 0.14% in favour of Geoană, significantly smaller than what pollsters predicted. Any explanation of the official result of the presidential runoff is definitely to be searched at the intersection of these two observations.
Let us consider the first one in relation to the official data from the Central Electoral Bureau (BEC). A higher electoral mobilization of Diaspora in the runoff compared to the first round is obvious, as turnout increases by over 55%. The share of Diaspora votes in favour of Traian Băsescu goes from 56.05% in the first round to 78.86% in the second round (a gain of 62,977 voters and 119%), while Mircea Geoană goes up from 12.41% to a modest 21.14% (a gain of 19,328 voters and 165%). In the absence of survey data for the Diaspora, it is quite impossible to assess how stable were the electorates of the two candidates between the two rounds or to estimate the vote distribution of thwarted voters and newcomers in the runoff. Although this research direction is a dead end due to the lack of data, the remarkable mobilization of Diaspora voters in the second round, apparently with positive effects for the success of Traian Băsescu, should be emphasized at this level.
The second observation is definitely more promising in terms of empirical investigation. If a 'theoretical' distribution of votes is to be considered, Mircea Geoană was expected to easily win the runoff (by more than 60%) over domestic polling stations. The actual distribution of votes confirmed his victory, however by a feeble (and insufficient) margin. Such a gap between the theoretical vote and the actual one might originate in several possible campaign developments: (a) a mobilization scenario, according to which a considerable number of newcomers voted in the second round, overwhelmingly in favour of Traian Băsescu; (b) a demobilization scenario, according to which a large share of thwarted voters did not vote in the second round, thus making runoff-support alliances futile; (c) a campaign context scenario, according to which several campaign developments between the two rounds might have generated switches in the electoral choice or defections from the 'recommended' vote. It is a rather common finding in electoral research that thwarted voters do not 'automatically' redirect their vote towards the runoff contender indicated by their first round preferred candidate. It is not unusual for such a voter to experience a dissonance between the support recommendation of the first round preferred candidate and his/her values, opinions or sympathies; such a dissonance might convert into vote abstention or even a contrary vote.
Such deviations from the 'theoretical' vote due to dissonances are very likely in the case of Mircea Geoană, given the extremely heterogeneous runoff support in terms of ideologies, traditional political conflicts, etc. Fortunately these analytical directions can be subject to in-depth investigation based on panel data from the Romanian Election Studies (RES) surveys. They are the central focus of this article. There are obvious limitations deriving from the nature of survey data employed (vote for the winner overreporting, analyses on small subsamples, etc.) that are discussed when necessary.
Evolutions in turnout and vote between the two rounds
There are many dangers in analysing such developments using survey data.
Findings may be subject to serious bias due to at least two categories of overreporting effects. First, turnout overreporting occurs. This means that postelection survey data usually show a turnout rate that is significantly higher than the official one, introducing obvious biases: analyses are performed on a subsample of presumed voters; however some of them are fake voters whose answers are treated as if they belonged to genuine voters. Turnout overreporting is usually explained in the literature as a combination of social desirability effects and limitations of human memory. Unfortunately, in the case of RES survey, these effects are overlapped by a panel study effect and a contextual one. In the first case, respondents to a panel study tend to become better informed and more participative, since they are aware of being questioned over several waves. In the second case, Romanian statistics appear to underestimate official turnout (see Comșa 2012; Rotariu 2012). All these three categories of effects (turnout overreporting, raise in electoral awareness due to panel effects, and official turnout underestimation) contribute to an increase in the estimated gap between official and selfreported turnout 1 .
Second, an overreporting in vote for the winner might occur, in relation or not with turnout overreporting. Post-election survey data usually indicate a larger share of pro-winner votes compared to official results. This might be the consequence of at least two alternative scenarios: either the pretended voters (as discussed above) report voting for the winner more frequently than the rest of the electorate (double overreporting), or there are genuine voters who report a false pro-winner vote 2 (winner overreporting). Usually, the literature does not differentiate between the two scenarios, as they are assumed to have a common origin. When the distance in time between the act of voting and the survey is reasonably short (as it is the case for the RES study), therefore the risk of memory failures is low, explanations of prowinner overreporting are linked to various stances of the social desirability phenomenon. It might be a case of bandwagon effect, as depicted by Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1968 [1944] ), that states the existence of a category of voters that wish to be associated to the winner and hence report a false vote in favour of him/her (or do not report their genuine vote for the loser). Or it might be due to some sort of fear of social isolation that makes people self-censor minoritarian opinions and positions (in this case vote for the defeated candidate), conceptualised through Noelle-Neumann's spiral of silence (1984) . No matter the reasons that lie behind pro-winner vote overreporting, there is no doubt it can introduce serious bias in surveybased analyses of electoral choice. However, the extreme polarization of the electoral context and the relative balance between the numbers of supporters of the two sides are likely to have contributed to rather small and isolated pro-winner overreporting effects.
In the light of these threats for the investigation, an estimation of overreporting effects is definitely a must before proceeding to further analyses on RES panel data. The findings are presented in tables 1 and 2.
First, turnout overreporting is close to 28% for both rounds of the election, which is relatively high 3 . Second, data do not show an overreporting in vote for the winner 4 in any of the two rounds. A reverse tendency can be observed immediately after the moment of elections (wave 2 after first round, wave 3 after runoff).
Furthermore, reported vote choices deviate little from the official results, especially when the runoff is to be considered. Another aspect that draws attention is that between waves 2 and 3 (both post factum) Mircea Geoană and Traian Băsescu switch places in the ranking of reported vote for the first round: while vote for the social-democrat candidate remains constant, the acting president grows by 1.7%. This development might be related to variations in attrition rate between the two waves or it might reflect a 'pro-winner' effect after the runoff. 3 Turnout overreporting is higher than the one suggested by studies dedicated to other elections in Romania. However, a significant share of reported turnout is expected to be genuine, due to an increase in awareness introduced by the panel study. 4 Overall, both rounds have been won by Traian Băsescu, in spite of the unusual result of the runoff (the incumbent defeated across domestic polling stations, but winning after the counting of votes from abroad). Given the circumstances, vote for Traian Băsescu will be considered in measuring pro-winner vote overreporting for both rounds of the presidential elections.
This picture on the magnitude of overreporting effects is far from being able to offer a solid answer to our initial question about how tolerable these effects are for further analyses. On the one side, the capacity of data to reproduce the real structure of vote for both rounds, with minimal errors, is encouraging. On the other side, the implications of the significant gap between the self-declared turnout and the official one are rather difficult to assess. In an optimistic scenario, the gap might be just a 'virtual' one, due to a panel survey effect combined with errors in official statistics. However, the pessimistic scenario cannot be ignored, particularly if it is combined with analyses on small-size subsamples. Such a risk should not be overlooked and asks for caution in interpreting the findings of this article. 
Thwarted voters in the runoff of the 2009 presidential election
According to RES panel survey data, the share of thwarted voters within those voting in the first round electorate is of about 27%. In other words, more than a quarter of them still vote in the runoff even in the absence of their preferred candidate. Their share within the electorate is large enough However, it is hard to believe that such reasoning is that widespread among the electorate to have an impact on the conclusions.
to presume they had a decisive contribution in setting the result of the runoff, What are the main findings? First, the first block (relative preferences for the candidates and parties) has a very large contribution in explaining the runoff 7 The first one is measured as opinion on the authenticity of the incriminating film, with dichotomous answer categories. The reference category is the opinion that the film is authentic. The second one is measured as opinion on the statement that the agreement between Mircea Geoană and Crin Antonescu for supporting Klaus Iohannis for prime minister is a good thing for Romania, again with dichotomous answer categories. The reference category is the favourable opinion (yes, it is a good thing). 8 The explanatory model of vote in favour of Mircea Geoană is the 'mirror image' of this model.
choices of thwarted voters. Thus, based on the sympathy scores of finalists and their parties, one could easily predict the choice of 85% of the thwarted voters. However, it is obvious that things are not as simple as they look. The preferences are measured after the election (RES wave 3), when some of the thwarted voters might have already solved post factum their cognitive dissonances, by adding a plus of rationality to the answers for popularity items. Conversely, short-term campaign developments appear to have a rather small contribution in explaining the decision of thwarted voters. On the other side, they 'strengthen' decisively (and divisively) the choice for or against each of the two finalists. This 'separation effect' looks stronger for the opposition candidate (the theoretical winner of the two campaign developments) than for the incumbent. Yet, overall, long-term established attitudes appear to weigh more on the decision of thwarted voters than recent campaign developments. Logistic regression, b coefficients with standard errors, exp(b), *** p<0.001, ** p<0.010, * p<0.050, † p<0.100
Second, party preference (or rejection) is a better predictor of thwarted voters' runoff choice than candidate preference, although it is about a presidential election. Thus, thwarted voters prefer to rely on the party shortcut than on candidates' evaluation in their attempt to assess the lesser evil in a presidential runoff. This cannot come as a surprise, since the two finalists had already been labelled as 'unattractive' in the context of the first round. Moreover, especially in the case of Mircea Geoană, one can easily identify a solid record of sympathies and antipathies targeting his party (PSD) originating in the first years of the post-communist transition. This record, mainly framed in the logic of continuity between the former Communist Party and PSD, has been constantly emphasized in the campaign discourse of Traian Băsescu.
The vote of newcomers in the runoff of the 2009 presidential elections
As previously noted, newcomers are a little over 9 percent among those voting in the second round of the presidential elections. These are voters that, for various reasons 9 , did not participate in the first round of elections.
Newcomers are dominantly mobilized in favour of Traian Băsescu (59.2%) and it is likely that they contributed to reducing the distance between the incumbent and its social-democrat opponent over domestic polling stations. Traian Băsescu is more successful than his opponent in winning votes among the undecided and those decided not to turn out. Moreover, he successfully 'turns over' one in three newcomers whom initially expressed relative preference for Mircea Geoană. Such observations must be regarded with caution, given the small n and the risk of bandwagon effects for such atypical voters as the newcomers. Still, they suggest some form of contextual mobilisation of newcomers existed and worked in favour of the incumbent.
Next, the rationalities of the electoral decision among newcomers are explored. The logic behind these explanatory models is similar to the one previously used in the case of thwarted voters, but the emphasis is on the block of relative preferences for the candidate and the party. The reference categories in the model are the incumbent, Traian Băsescu, and his party, the Democrat-Liberal Party. The explanatory model does not comprise contextual factors, as they are likely to impact mobilisation rather than the decision for who to vote. 
Conclusions
This article aimed at investigating the main developments within the On a first direction of investigation, focus was given to the vote transfers between the two rounds of the electoral competition. Arguments were offered for the thesis of a highly disciplined PNL electorate, obviously opposed to Traian Băsescu that largely votes for Mircea Geoană in the runoff.
On the other side, the incumbent was effective in attracting large segments of thwarted voters, in spite of the generalized runoff-support for socialdemocrat leader offered by candidates eliminated in the first round.
Moreover, Traian Băsescu gains the votes of a significant share of newcomers,
people that had been absent in the first round.
The second direction of investigation was dedicated to the thwarted voters and their rationalities of making second-order electoral choices in the runoff. In their attempt to choose between the two finalists, thwarted voters appear to rely dominantly on their long-term relative preference for parties and candidates. The party preference is a better predictor of the runoff vote than the candidate preference, which is quite natural if we consider that both finalists 
